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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

DARLENE COLLINS, as guardian of
VICKIE L. COLLINS, an incompetent
person,

:
:
Case No.

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

vs.

:

UTAH STATE DEVELOPMENTAL
CENTER, and the UTAH STATE
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES and the STATE OF UTAH,

:
:

Defendants/Petitioners.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the Court of Appeals err when it determined that the safety precautions
required to be utilized by an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded when
allowing a 40-year old severely mentally retarded woman, with schizophrenia and a
seizure disorder, to use a regular playground swing were within the knowledge of a lay
jury and did not require expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care?
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The Court of Appeals opinion is reported at Collins v. Utah State Developmental
Center, et ah. 1999 UT App 336, 382 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. A copy is attached hereto as
Addendum A.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals' decision was entered on November 18, 1999. No petition
for rehearing was filed. An Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File a
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed and an Order was issued by the Supreme Court
on December 20, 1999 granting defendants an additional thirty days, up to and including
January 19, 2000, in which to file this petition for a writ of certiorari. A copy of the
Order is attached as Addendum C.
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals' decision under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5)( 1996).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The following determinative provisions are set forth in Addendum D to this
petition:
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1, et seq.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(11)
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-4(4.401 (A)( 1994)
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-4(4.701 (A)( 1994)
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-4(4.701(B)( 1994)
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103)(A)(l)-(2)(1994)
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103(F)(4)(1994)
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103(F)(5)(1994)
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Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103(F)(6)(1994)
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.106)(A)(1994)
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.106)(B)(1994)
Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.201)(A)(l)(1994)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Darlene Collins brought this action in February, 1996 (R. 2), on behalf of her
daughter Vickie Collins, alleging that the Utah State Developmental Center was negligent
in allowing Vickie, an adult woman with profound mental retardation, schizophrenia
(Aplt. App. 7) and a history of seizures (Aplt. App. 9), to use a standard playground
swing without adequate safety devices (R. 2-5). Plaintiff also alleged that defendant was
negligent in failing to properly supervise Vickie and in failing to train employees on how
to care for Vickie (R. 2-5).
B.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
1. District Court

The case proceeded to jury trial beginning on May 12, 1998. Prior to trial,
defendants filed a motion in limine (R. 64-66), with a supporting memorandum (R. 6775), seeking to exclude plaintiffs designated expert witness, Lewis Mustard, from
testifying on the standard of care owed to Vickie by her health care providers at the Utah
State Developmental Center. Plaintiff filed a cross-motion (R. 79-80) and memorandum
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(R. 81-112) which, among other things, opposed exclusion of Mustard as an expert
witness (R. 82-84).
After defendants conducted voir dire of Mustard during trial, the district court
judge preliminarily sustained defendants' objections to Mustard's qualifications (Tr. 15),
but agreed to give plaintiff an opportunity to establish additional qualifying foundation
later in the day (Tr. 22-24). Plaintiffs attempt was unsuccessful, and the trial court ruled
that Mustard was not qualified to opine regarding alleged negligence on the part of the
defendants and the objection to his testimony was sustained (Tr. 274-295). At the close
of plaintiff s case-in-chief, the court reconvened while the jury was in recess, and
defendants moved for a directed verdict on the basis that plaintiff could not establish a
prima facie case on the standard of care in the absence of expert testimony. Defendants'
motion was orally granted from the bench (Tr. 330-37) and later reduced to writing (R.
166-71 and attached as Addendum B). An appeal followed (R. 193-94).
2. Court of Appeals
On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred in requiring expert
testimony on the standard of care applicable to the Developmental Center and, in the
alternative, that the district court erred in excluding Mustard as an expert witness on the
applicable standard of care.
Plaintiff did not argue that the Center was negligent in allowing Vickie to swing
(Collins v. USDC. 1999 UT App 336, 19, 382 Utah Adv. Rep. 21). Plaintiff conceded
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that the formulation of Vickie's Individual Habilitation Plan, including recommendations
for recreational activities, may have required expert testimony to establish the standard of
care (id.). Plaintiffs only contention on appeal was that the Developmental Center "was
negligent in failing to take the necessary safety precautions" for Vickie to swing (id.).
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict
because the standard of care in this action could be readily understood by lay jurors,
thereby eliminating the need for expert testimony. Collins v. USDC, 1999 UT App 336,
f 6, 382 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. The Court of Appeals declined to reach the issue of whether
the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing Dr. Mustard's proposed testimony. Id.
at If 12.
C. Statement of Facts
When the events forming the basis of this lawsuit took place in 1994, Vickie
Collins was a 40-year-old resident of the Utah State Developmental Center, having
resided there on a full-time basis since 1966 (Aplt. App. 7; Collins v. USDC 1999 UT
App 336, f 2). Vickie had a dual diagnosis of severe mental retardation and
schizophrenia (Aplt. App. 7; Collins at f 2). She also had a history of sporadic seizure
activity (Aplt. App. 17; Collins at f 2).
Residents at the Developmental Center, including Vickie, were allowed to choose
their own recreational activities within a range of options provided by the Center (Tr.
239-240). The Developmental Center took into account each resident's individual needs
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and disabilities in determining their choice of activities (Tr. 240). Any limitations on the
activities of seizure patients depended on the nature of that resident's seizures (Tr. 242).
Swinging had always been one of Vickie's favorite activities from the time she was a little
girl (Tr. 143-44). She would usually choose to swing over any other options that were
available to her (Tr. 261). She had been using the swings at the Developmental Center
without incident since she was a young girl (Tr. 253; 260).
At the time of the accident, Vickie was wearing a protective helmet which staff
required her to wear after she sustained head injuries when she fell during a seizure on
December 9, 1993, and hit her head on a filing cabinet (Aplt. Brf. at 15, ^f 20 and Collins

at I 3).
On March 9, 1994, Vickie and seven other residents of the Raintree building were
taken outside for recreational activities under the supervision of two staff members.
(Collins at Tf 4). Vickie, wearing her helmet, immediately went to the swings and began
swinging (Aplt. Brf. at 18, Tflf 32-33; Tr. 246-47 and Collins at % 4). A staff member
testified that she was within 10 to 15 feet of Vickie, with Vickie in her peripheral vision,
while kicking a ball to another resident (Tr. 253-54 and Collins at f 4). Within three or
four minutes, the staff member heard a thump and saw Vickie lying on the ground (Tr.
248). As a result of the fall, Vickie sustained a high-impact burst of the T-7 vertebra
which rendered her a paraplegic (Tr. 165-66 and Collins at Tf 4).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Decisions about Vickie's care and activities at the Developmental Center were
made by an interdisciplinary team of professionals including a qualified mental
retardation professional (QMRP), a social worker, a nurse, a recreational therapist, and
direct care staff (Tr. 290-91 and Collins at Tf 2). Each year, the treatment team conducted
a staffing and completed a comprehensive individual habilitation plan (IHP) reviewing all
facets of Vickie's institutional care and establishing treatment objectives and plans for her
medical, recreational, social, dietary, and other needs (Aplt. App. 7-20; Tr. 130-34 and
Collins at f 2).
The Developmental Center is an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally
Retarded (ICF/MR) (Collins at 12) and is regulated by the State of Utah. Each ICF/MR
is required to appoint, in writing, an administrator professionally licensed by the Utah
Department of Commerce as a nursing home administrator (Utah Admin. R. 432-1524(4.401(A)( 1994)). Each facility is required to develop and implement policies and
procedures which "promote the growth, development and independence of the client"
(Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.201)(A)(l)(1994)). State regulation further requires that
"[e]ach client shall have an individual program plan developed by an interdisciplinary
team that represents the professions, disciplines or service areas that are relevant to: (1)
identifying the client's needs . .. [and] (2) designing programs that meet the client's needs
(Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103(A)(1)-(2)(1994)). The individual program plan is
required to "identify mechanical supports, if needed, to achieve proper body position,
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balance, or alignment. The plan shall specify the reason for each support, the situations in
which each is to be applied, and a schedule for the use of each support" (Utah Admin. R.
432-152-5(5.103)(F)(4)(1994)). The plan is also required to "provide that clients who
have multiple disabling conditions spend a major portion of each waking day out of bed
and outside the bedroom area, moving about by various methods and devices whenever
possible" (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103)(F)(5)(1994)) and is also required to "include
opportunities for client choice and self-management" (Utah Admin. R. 432-1525(5.103)(F)(6)(1994)). The plan must be reviewed by a qualified mental retardation
professional (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.106)(A)( 1994)) and must be reviewed by the
interdisciplinary team at least annually (Utah Admin. R. 432-152(5.106)(B)(1994)).
State regulation requires that "[e]ach client's active treatment program shall be
integrated, coordinated and monitored by a qualified mental retardation professional."
(Utah Admin. R. 432-152-4(4.701)(A)(1994)). To qualify as a QMRP, a person must
have at least one year of experience working directly with persons with mental retardation
or other developmental disabilities, and must be a doctor of medicine or osteopathy, a
registered nurse, or must have a bachelor's degree and be qualified as an occupational
therapist, occupational therapy assistant, physical therapist, physical therapy assistant,
psychologist, social worker, speech-language pathologist or audiologist, professional
recreation staff member, professional dietitian, or a human services professional (Utah
Admin. R. 432-152-4(4.701)(B)( 1994)).
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In this case, Vickie had a current program plan, also known as an Individual
Habilitation Plan (IHP), which had been adopted on September 17, 1993 by an
interdisciplinary team including a qualified mental retardation professional, a psychology
assistant, a recreational therapist, and a social worker (Aplt. App. 7-20). Vickie's dentist,
medical doctor, dietitian, and audiologist submitted evaluations, but did not attend the
interdisciplinary team meeting (kl at 19). Vickie's mother and sister attended the team
meeting and approved the plan (Aplt. App. 19). One of the competencies/strengths
specifically identified in the plan was that Vickie "can swing and use play ground
equipment" (Aplt. App. 11).
ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS'DECISION IN THIS CASE
IS IN CONFLICT WITH PRIOR DECISIONS BY THIS
COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
The issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the Developmental Center was
negligent in failing to take the necessary safety precautions for Vickie to swing (Collins at
Tf 2). The Court of Appeals determined that the standard of care in this action could be
readily understood by lay jurors, thereby eliminating the need for expert testimony. This
decision is in conflict with prior case law out of this Court and the Court of Appeals.
A.

THE DEVELOPMENTAL CENTER IS A HIGHLY REGULATED
HEALTH CARE PROVIDER
The Developmental Center is a highly regulated Intermediate Care Facility for the

Mentally Retarded. It is required to have a licensed nursing home administrator as its
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director (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-4(4.401(A)). The Developmental Center is required to
"promote the growth, development and independence of each client (Utah Admin. R. 432152-5(5.201)(A)(1)). Each resident at the Center must have a plan developed by an
interdisciplinary team of professionals (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103)(A)(l)-(2))
which accommodates each resident's needs, keeps them moving about by various
methods, and includes opportunities for client choice and self-management (Utah Admin.
R. 432-152-5(5.103)(F)(5)-(6)). If any mechanical supports are to be used, they must be
identified in the plan with a justification for their use and an explanation as to when they
are to be used (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103)(F)(4)). In addition, each resident's plan
must be integrated, coordinated and monitored by a qualified mental retardation
professional (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-4(4.701)(A)). The QMRP must have experience
working with the developmentally disabled or the mentally retarded. The QMRP must
have at least a bachelor's degree and maintain a license as a physician, registered nurse,
occupational therapist or assistant, physical therapist or assistant, psychologist, social
worker, speech-language pathologist or audiologist, professional recreation staff member,
or otherwise qualify as a dietitian, or a human services professional (Utah Admin. R. 432152-4(4.701)(B)( 1994)).
Prior to filing this action, plaintiff complied with the Utah Healthcare Malpractice
Act (Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1, et seq.) which requires compliance with its terms prior to
filing a malpractice action against a health care provider. "Health care provider" is
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defined under the act to include physicians, registered nurses, physical therapist,
psychologist, audiologist, speech-language pathologist, social worker, social service
worker, or others rendering similar care and services (Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(11)).
Prior to her accident, an interdisciplinary team including a QMRP, a psychology
assistant, a recreational therapist and a social worker with input from Vickie?s dentist,
physician, dietitian, and audiologist, created an individual habilitation plan to address
Vickie's specific needs (Aplt. App. 7-20). The QMRP and the interdisciplinary team
charged with managing Vickie's care and treatment at the Developmental Center clearly
meet the definition of health care providers under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
B.

EXPERT TESTIMONY IS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THE
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE IF THE PROPRIETY OF A
DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS IS NOT WITHIN THE COMMON
KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE OF A LAY PERSON
Plaintiff has already conceded that the formulation of Vickie's plan, "including the

recommendation for recreational activities, was specialized in nature and may have
required expert testimony to determine the standard of care owed to her in making those
recommendations." Collins at ^f 9. However, no attempt was made by plaintiff or by the
Court of Appeals to explain how the teamfs determination, or lack thereof, that allowed
Vickie to use a standard playground swing without additional safety precautions fell
within the realm of knowledge of a lay person.
This Court held in Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980) that in a
majority of medical malpractice actions, the plaintiff must establish the applicable
11
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standard of care and a breach of that standard of care through expert testimony. The
Nixdorf court recognized an exception to this general rule when "the propriety of the
treatment received is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman.1' Id.
The Court of Appeals has also held that expert testimony must be provided in
medical malpractice cases to establish the standard of care, defendant's failure to comply
with that standard, and that defendant caused plaintiffs injuries. See Hoopiiaina v. IHC.
740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The Hoopiiaina court also found that "issues of
fact which are outside the knowledge and experience of lay persons must be established
by expert testimony." Id.
Even if this Court determines that the action of the QMRP and the interdisciplinary
team in failing to require additional safety precautions in order for Vickie to swing was
not health care, expert testimony was still required on the standard of care.
This Court extended the application of the general rule requiring expert testimony
to non-medical cases in Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 1985).
This Court ruled in Wessel that "[o]rdinarily, the standard of care in a trade or profession
must be determined by testimony of witnesses in the same trade or profession." Id at
253. In Wessel plaintiff claimed that defendant had negligently landscaped his yard,
causing the retaining walls to collapse, sending a substantial portion of his yard into the
street. This Court ruled that the trial court improperly excluded the testimony of a
structural engineer on the standard of care owed by a landscape architect.
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The Court of Appeals has also required expert testimony to establish the applicable
standard of care in non-medical cases. The Court of Appeals ruled in Schreiter v.
Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(duty of high-rise retirement
home to install sprinkler system) that expert testimony is "needed f[w]here the average
person has little understanding of the duties owed by particular trades or professions,1 as
in cases involving medical doctors, architects, and engineers." Schreiter at 574, quoting
Wvcalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert denied, 789
P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). The Court adopted the Nixdorf exception to the general rule and
concluded that "[w]here the propriety of the defendant's action fis within the common
knowledge and experience of the layman . . . the guidance provided by expert testimony is
unnecessary.1" Schreiter at 574, quoting Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah
1980)(ellipses in original). See also Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Product, Inc., 939 P.2d 1213
(Utah Ct. App. 1997)(construction worker injured when he was hit by chute of truck that
was pouring concrete) and Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Koller, 943 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997)(legal malpractice claim).
C.

DEFENDANTS1 ACTIONS IN THIS CASE WERE NOT WITHIN THE
COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE OF A LAY PERSON
The issue on appeal, as presented by plaintiff, was whether the Developmental

Center "was negligent in failing to take the necessary safety precautions11 for Vickie to
use a swing. The Court of Appeals concluded in this case that plaintiffs action against
the Developmental Center "did not call into question ?the conduct of a professional in his
13
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area of expertise.1" Collins at ^f 10 quoting Moore v. Louis Smith Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 454
S.E.2d 190, 192 (Ga.Ct.App. 1995). The Court of Appeals decision goes on to conclude
that expert testimony was not required in this case because "[m]ost jurors could easily
ascertain the standard of care owed to a three-year-old when supervising her on a swing.
Similarly, they would understand the standard of care owed to a person with Collins's
capacities." Collins atf 10.
This conclusion makes the assumption, without any supporting analysis, that the
developmentally disabled and the mentally retarded are comparable to children and that a
lay jury can apply the same standard of care to both. This analysis fails to acknowledge
the involvement of the interdisciplinary team, headed by a qualified mental retardation
professional, which is responsible for directing every aspect of Vickie's care and
treatment at the Developmental Center. The Court's decision fails to explain how a lay
jury has experience with regulating the daily activities of a severely retarded adult with a
mental illness and a seizure disorder while providing opportunities for "client choice and
self-management" (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103(F)(4)-(6)) and promoting "growth,
development and independence of the client (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.201)(A)(1)).
In the only other case involving the standard of care applicable to an intermediate
care facility for the mentally retarded that defendants could locate, the Court of Appeals
of Tennessee concluded in an unpublished opinion, Reasons v. State of Tennessee, 1987
WL 16560 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)(attached at Addendum E), that expert testimony was

14
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required to establish the standard of care applicable to a resident's dietary needs. In
Reasons, the plaintiff, a resident at a state-run intermediate care facility for the mentally
retarded, was a mentally retarded man who choked on a chicken bone after grabbing food
from another resident's plate. As in the present case, an interdisciplinary team at the
Center developed an individual habilitation plan for each resident which included the
ascertainment and establishment of each resident's dietary needs. The Assistant
Superintendent for the Center "testified that it was a basic underlying policy at the Center,
mandated by applicable federal guidelines, that to the greatest extent possible, residents at
the Center were to be 'normalized.'" Id. at 3. He further explained that residents "were
entitled to the 'dignity of risk,' that in order to allow mentally retarded patients to develop
to their fullest capacity, they should be permitted to run the risks of danger or harm in
progressing up the ladder of development." IcL The Court of Appeals of Tennessee
concluded that "a resident's dietary needs under these circumstances are something
outside the scope of common knowledge of a layman and require a professional
determination." Id. at 3.
Likewise, in the present case, Vickie's recreational needs were determined by an
interdisciplinary team of professionals. The decision regarding what safety precautions
were necessary, if any, for a 40-year-old severely retarded woman with schizophrenia and
a seizure disorder who had been swinging on regular playground swings all of her life
when balanced against the requirement to "include opportunities for client choice and

15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

self-management" (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.103)(F)(6)) and promote her "growth,
development and independence" (Utah Admin. R. 432-152-5(5.201)(A)(1)) is outside the
scope of common knowledge of a lay person and requires expert testimony.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals erred in determining that the conduct of defendants in this
case was within the knowledge of a lay person and did not require expert testimony to
establish the applicable standard of care. Defendants respectfully request that this Court
grant its Petition for Certiorari and review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of January, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

£

BARBARA E. OCHOA
STEVEN A. COMBE
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Petitioners/Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI, postage prepaid, this 19th day of January, 2000, to the
following:
Brian S. King
Richard R. Burke
KING & ISAACSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
4 Triad Center, Suite 825
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180

jA/l
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This opinion is subject to revision before
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Attorneys:
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Jan Graham and Nancy L. Kemp, Salt Lake City, for Appellees

Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme.
BENCH, Judge:

m

I

. Darlene Collins, mother of Vickie Collins, appeals the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the Utah State
Developmental Center (Center), which was based on her failure to present competent expert testimony in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

support of her negligence action against the Center. We reverse.
BACKGROUND

112.
The underlying facts in this case are undisputed. When the events forming the basis of this lawsuit took place,
Vickie Collins was a forty-year-old resident of the Center, an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded.
Throughout her life, Collins has suffered from severe mental retardation, multiple types of seizures, and
schizophrenia. The Center had a limited guardianship over Collins to provide for her care. Decisions about her
care were made by a team of professionals, including a qualified mental retardation professional, a social
worker, a nurse, a recreational therapist, and direct care staff. Each year, the treatment team developed an
Individual Habitation Plan (IHP) for Collins, which provided specific treatment objectives and plans for her
medical, recreational, social, dietary, and other needs.

IP.
Collins's seizure activity increased significantly in 1993, which was noted in her IHP. The Center did not
thereafter reevaluate Collins's recreational activities, but did place her in a protective helmet. On March 9,
1994, while wearing her helmet, Collins joined seven other residents outside to play under the supervision of
two staff members. She immediately went to the swings and began swinging. A staff member was within ten to
fifteen feet of Collins when she fell from the swing and was seriously injured. She is now a paraplegic.

114.
Collins, through her mother, filed this negligence action against the Center under the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, presumably because the Center is a health care provider covered by the Act. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-3(11) (Supp. 1999). The Center filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the testimony of
Collins's designated expert witness, Dr. Lewis Mustard, who was prepared to testify regarding the standard of
care owed to Collins and a breach of that standard by the Center. Dr. Mustard holds a Ph.D. in Health
Administration, has taught numerous courses and seminars in health care management and administration,
and has twenty-five years of experience in hospital administration. At trial, the court preliminarily sustained the
Center's objection to Dr. Mustard's proposed testimony, but agreed to give Collins further opportunity to qualify
Dr. Mustard as an expert later in the day. Collins's later attempt to qualify Dr. Mustard was unsuccessful. At the
close of Collins's case-in-chief, the Center moved for a directed verdict arguing that, given the absence of
expert testimony, Collins did not establish the applicable standard of care and a breach thereof. The court
agreed, concluding that the case required expert testimony, and granted the Center's motion for a directed
verdict. This appeal followed.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
U5.
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court properly granted a directed verdict in favor of
the Center. In reviewing a directed verdict, "'[w]e must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that
would support a judgment in favor of the losing party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained.'" Virginia S. v.
Salt Lake Care Ctr.. 741 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Management Comm. of Graystone Pines
Homeowners Ass'n v. Graystone Pines. Inc.. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982)). A directed verdict is only
"appropriate if, on uncontested facts and under the applicable law, one party is entitled to judgment." Brehany
v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991).
ANALYSIS

116.
Collins first argues that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict because the standard of care in this
action could be readily understood by lay jurors, thereby eliminating the need for expert testimony. We agree.

117.
"In medical malpractice cases, expert testimony is generally required to establish the standard of care
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'because the nature of the profession removes the particularities of its practice from the knowledge and
understanding of the average citizen."' Virginia S.. 741 P.2d at 971 (quoting Nixdorfv. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348,
352 (Utah 1980)). However, "expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed the
plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment received is within the common knowledge and experience of the
layman." Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 352.

118.
This case falls within the Nixdorf "common-knowledge" exception because "there are no medical technicalities
involved that call for expert testimony to determine whether the [Center] breached its standard of care." Virginia
SL 741 P.2d at 972. Virginia S. involved the rape of a seventeen-year-old girl, incapable of consenting to sex,
while under the care and custody of the Salt Lake Care Center. See id. at 970. She suffered from neurodegenerative disease, severe mental retardation, progressive dementia, seizures, muscle weakness, and
failing eyesight and hearing. See id. This court concluded that expert testimony was unnecessary because the
standard of care owed to Virginia S. to protect her from rape falls within the common-knowledge exception.
See id. at 972. Likewise, a lay juror can readily evaluate the alleged negligence by the Center in failing to
protect Collins from a swing injury.

H9.
Collins does not dispute that the Center's formulation of her IHP, including recommendations for recreational
activities, was special in nature and may have required expert testimony to determine the standard of care
owed to her in making those recommendations. But the formulation of the IHP is not at issue here. Collins also
does not argue that the Center was negligent in allowing her to swing. Rather, Collins simply contends that the
Center was negligent in failing to take the necessary safety precautions for this very common recreational
activity. Although Collins filed her claim under the Malpractice Act, it is clear from the following relevant
allegations in Collins's original complaint that her case was one of simple negligence:
14. The defendants' employees were negligent in placing [Collins] on a swing which did not
contain adequate safety devices to keep [Collins] from falling from it. The employees were aware
of [Collins's] mental and physical limitations and knew of the seizures she has suffered from in
the recent past yet the defendants' employees failed to take proper precautions to ensure
[Collins's] safety.
15. The defendants' employees were negligent in failing to utilize the swings available at the
Developmental Center specifically made to provide adequate support to handicapped individuals.
16. The defendants' employees were negligent in failing to adequately supervise [Collins] as she
was swinging on or about March 9,1994.
17. The defendants were negligent in failing to adequately staff the facility to provide adequate
supervision of [Collins] and in failing to train employees on how to care for [Collins].
See Moore v. Louis Smith Mem'l Hosp., Inc.. 454 S.E.2d 190, 192 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (providing that court
must look to substance of action against health care facility to determine whether action is for professional or
simple negligence). The plaintiff in Moore was injured when a nursing assistant moved her from a wheelchair
to a bed, and her foot became caught in the bed rail. See id. at 191. The court found that the injury involved
simple negligence, "rather than an act requiring the exercise of expert medical judgment." JdL at 192. The
decision regarding when and how a patient should be transported may require expert medical judgment.
However, the actual "'safe movement of [plaintiff] from the [wheelchair to the bed] was merely an act of relative
physical strength and dexterity.'" jd. (citation omitted, alterations in original).
1110.
Likewise, Collins's action against the Center did not call into question '"the conduct of a professional in his area
of expertise."' \jL (citation omitted). The record does not show, and the Center does not suggest, that the
implementation of the decision to allow Collins to swing had "to be performed by a person with medical training
or that it involved the exercise of medical judgment or required medical expertise." kL Most jurors could easily
ascertain the standard of care owed to a three-year-old when supervising her on a swing. Similarly, they would
understand the standard of care owed to a person with Collins's capacities. Simply put, the duty the Center
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owed to Collins, and its alleged breach, required no expert testimony.

mi.
Collins therefore did not need expert testimony to establish the appropriate standard of care and any breach
thereof. "In this type of situation, the plaintiff can rely on the common knowledge and understanding of laymen
to establish this element." Nixdorf. 612 P.2d at 353. Thus, under the applicable law, the Center was not entitled
to a directed verdict in its favor. SeeWycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(stating that m[o]rdinarily, whether a defendant has breached the required standard of care is a question of fact
for the jury'") (citation omitted).
U12.
Having determined that the trial court erred in requiring expert testimony, we need not reach the issue of
whether the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing Dr. Mustard's proposed testimony.
CONCLUSION

1113.
The trial court erred in entering a directed verdict based on Collins's inability to present competent expert
testimony because expert testimony was unnecessary. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

1J14.
W E CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DARLENE COLLINS, as guardian
of VICKIE COLLINS, an
incompetent person,

:

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT

Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH STATE DEVELOPMENTAL
CENTER, and the UTAH STATE
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
and the STATE OF UTAH,

Civil No. 960901154 CV
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for jury trial commencing
May 12, 1998.

Plaintiff was represented by counsel, Brian S.

King, Richard R. Burke and Butch L. Johnson.

Defendants were

represented by counsel, Barbara E. Ochoa and Steven A. Combe. At
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the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, and after she had rested,
defendants moved the Court for a directed verdict pursuant to
Rule 50(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court, having

-^

heard the plaintiff's evidence and the argument of counsel, ruled
from the bench as follows:
A directed verdict is appropriate under Rule 50(a), Utah

::

Rules of Civil Procedure, when the court concludes that
reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be determined
from the evidence presented.
While this case does not present the classic medical
malpractice claim, it does include the provision of health care
services of the type beyond the scope of knowledge of a lay
juror.

As a result, expert testimony is required on the standard

of care applicable at an intermediate care facility for the
mentally retarded under the circumstances of this case.

Expert

testimony is also required to establish a breach of that standard
of care.

Without such expert testimony, plaintiff is unable to

establish two of the elements of her prima facie case.

2
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Plaintiff's proposed expert witness on the standard of care,
Lewis Mustard, Ph.D., was not allowed to testify regarding his
opinions in this case because he did not have the requisite
qualifications.

While he was eminently qualified in hospital

management, he had no formal education or schooling in patient
care, his prior work experience was primarily in institutions
which did not deal with the developmentally disabled or mentally
retarded, he has never rendered treatment to the mentally
disabled, he has not made decisions related to safety and
recreation for the developmentally disabled, and he is not
familiar with the standard of care at any other intermediate care
facility for the mentally retarded, including the use of
recreational equipment at the facilities.

Dr. Mustard is not a

qualified mental retardation professional, he is not a licensed
professional in any field, he could not recall the last time he
observed an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded
and he had not reviewed policies for other intermediate care
facilities for the mentally retarded, nor was he familiar with
the practice at other intermediate care facilities for the

3
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(

(

mentally retarded regarding the use of recreational equipment by
individuals with conditions similar to those of Vickie Collins.
The application of risk management principles is distinct from
the relevant issues in this case.

As a result of all of the

foregoing, the Court ruled that Dr. Mustard was not qualified to
opine on the alleged negligence of the Utah State Developmental
Center.
Without the testimony of an expert witness on the issues of
standard of care and breach of the standard of care, plaintiff
has failed to establish two of the requisite elements of her
claim and her case fails as a matter of law.
Based upon all of the foregoing, the Court now enters the
following Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants'
motion for directed verdict is granted and a verdict is hereby
rendered in favor of defendants.

Judgment is entered in favor of

defendants and against plaintiff for defendants' costs of action
in this matter in the amount of $

.

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rt *\ i\ A

n

A

•* /

DATED this

day of

, 1998.

Approved as to form:

BRIAN S. KING
RICHARD R. BURKE
BUTCH L. JOHNSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I sent via facsimile and mailed a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, postage prepaid, this
of July, 1998, to the following:
Brian S. King
Butch L. Johnson
Richard R. Burke
KING & ISAACSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4 Triad Center, Suite 825
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180

rfr^^
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
DARLENE COLLINS, as guardian
of VICKIE L. COLLINS, an
incompetent person,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Court of Appeals
Case No. 981511-CA
District Court
Case No. 960901154 CV

UTAH STATE DEVELOPMENTAL
CENTER, and the UTAH STATE
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
and the STATE OF UTAH,
Defendants/Appellees.
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS1 EX PARTE MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
IN WHICH TO FILE A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Defendants1 Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time in which
to File a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari came before the Utah
Supreme Court on December 20, 1999.
The original time for filing a petition for a writ of
certiorari had not yet expired and good cause appears for
granting the requested 3 0-day extension.

Therefore, the

following order is hereby entered:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants are
granted an additional thirty days, up to and including January
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19, 2000, in which to file a petition for writ of certiorari.
day of (ci-OLA^KshiA-*?

DATED this

1999.

W^b ^ / ^ ^ e ^ f c r ^
CLERK OF THE COURT
UTAH SUPREME COURT
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE MOTION FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME IN WHICH TO FILE A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI,
postage prepaid, this &&

day of {^Uhlw^,

1999, to the

following:
Brian S. King
Richard R. Burke
KING & ISAACSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4 Triad Center, Suite 825
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180

^

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<£1&J^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on December 21,1999, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was
deposited in the United States mail to the party(ies) listed below:
BRIAN S. KING
RICHARD R. BURKE
KING & ISAACSON
4 TRIAD CTR STE 825
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84180
NANCY L. KEMP
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160E300S6THFLR
PO BOX 140856
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0856

and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand delivered to a personal
representative of the court(s) listed below:
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: SUZY CARLSON
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
JULIA D'ALESANDRO
COURT OF APPEALS
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 140230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230

Deputy Clerk
CaseNo.981511-SC
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE , 960901154
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JUDICIAL CODE

county where any defendant in such action resides; and if any
such defendant is a corporation, the county in which such
corporation has an office or place of business shall be deemed
the county in which such corporation resides, within the
meaning of this section.
1995
78-13-6. Arising without this state in favor of resident.
All transitory causes of action arising without this state in
favor of residents of this state shall, if action is brought
thereon in this state, be brought and tried in the county where
the plaintiff resides, or in the county where the principal
defendant resides, or if the principal defendant is a corporation, then in the county where the plaintiff resides or in the
county where such corporation has an office or place of
business, subject, however, to a change of venue as provided by
law.
1953

party at whose instance the order was made; provided, that
when such order is made for the reason that the cause was
commenced in the wrong county, the costs of transfer and
filing the papers anew shall be paid by the plaintiff in the
action within ten days after the making of such order, or said
cause shall be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The court to
which an action or proceeding is transferred shall have and
exercise the same jurisdiction as if it had been originally
commenced therein.
1953
CHAPTER 14
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS AGAINST HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS
Section
78-14-1.
78-14-2.

Short title of act.
Legislative findings and declarations — Purpose of act.
78-14-3.
Definitions.
78-14-4.
Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Application.
78-14-4.5.
Amount of award reduced by amounts of collateral sources available to plaintiff — No
reduction where subrogation right exists —
Collateral sources defined — Procedure to
preserve subrogation rights — Evidence admissible — Exceptions.
78-14-5.
Failure to obtain informed consent — Proof
required of patient — Defenses — Consent to
health care.
78-14-6.
Writing required as basis for liability for
78-13-8. Change of v e n u e — Conditions precedent.
breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or
If the county in which the action is commenced is not the
assurance of result.
proper county for the trial thereof, the action may nevertheAd damnum clause prohibited in complaint.
less be tried therein, unless the defendant at the time he 78-14-7.
Limitation of award of noneconomic damages
answers or otherwise appears files a motion, in writing, that 78-14-7.1.
in malpractice actions.
the trial be had in the proper county.
1953
78-14-7.5.
Limitation on attorney's contingency fee in
78-13-9. Grounds.
malpractice action.
The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the 78-14-8.
Notice of intent to commence action.
following cases:
78-14-9.
Professional liability insurance coverage for
(1) when the county designated in the complaint is not
providers — Insurance commissioner may
the proper county;
require joint underwriting authority.
(2) when there is reason to believe that an impartial 78-14-9.5.
Periodic payment of future damages in maltrial cannot be had in the county, city, or precinct desigpractice actions.
nated in the complaint;
Actions under Utah Governmental Immunity
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of 78-14-10.
Act.
justice would be promoted by the change;
Act not retroactive — Exception.
(4) when all the parties to an action, by stipulation or 78-14-11.
by consent in open court entered in the minutes, agree 78-14-12.
Division to provide panel — Exemption —
that the place of trial may be changed to another county.
Procedures — Statute of limitations tolled —
Thereupon the court must order the change as agreed
Composition of panel — Expenses — Diviupon.
1953
sion authorized to set license fees.
78-14-13.
Proceedings
— Authority of panel — Rights of
78-13-10. Court to w h i c h transfer is to b e made.
parties to proceedings.
If any action or proceeding is commenced or is pending in a
Decision and recommendations of panel — No
court and the court orders the place of trial to be changed, it 78-14-14.
judicial or other review.
must be transferred for trial to a court the parties may agree
upon by stipulation in writing or made in open court and 78-14-15.
Evidence of proceedings not admissible in subentered in the minutes, or if they do not so agree, then to the
sequent action — Panelist may not be comnearest court where like objection or cause for making the
pelled to testify — Immunity of panelist from
)rder does not exist.
1953
civil liability — Information regarding professional conduct.
78-13-11. Duty of clerk — Fees and costs — Effect on
78-14-16.
Proceedings
considered a binding arbitration
jurisdiction.
hearing upon written agreement of parties
When an order is made transferring an action or proceeding
— Compensation to members of panel.
or trial, the court must transmit the pleadings and papers
Arbitration agreements.
herein to the court to which it is transferred. The costs and 78-14-17.
ees therefor and filing the papers anew must be paid by the 78-14-1. Short title of act.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah
Health
Care Malpractice
Act."
1976
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark
Law School, BYU.

78-13-7. All other actions.
In all other cases the action must be tried in the county in
which the cause of action arises, or in the county in which any
defendant resides at the commencement of the action; provided, that if any such defendant is a corporation, any county
in which such corporation has its principal office or place of
business shall be deemed the county in which such corporation
resides within the meaning of this section. If none of the
defendants resides in this state, such action may be commenced and tried in any county which the plaintiff may
designate in his complaint; and if the defendant is about to
depart from the state, such action may be tried in any county
where any of the parties resides or service is had, subject,
however, to the power of the court to change the place of trial
as provided by law.
1953
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78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations — Purpose of act.
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits
and claims for damages and the amount of judgments and
settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in
recent years. Because of these increases the insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice
insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and
increased claims is increased health care cost, both through
the health care providers passing the cost of premiums to the
patient and through the provider's practicing defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a
lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing to provide services because of the high
cost and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance.
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of
alleviating the adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's health care system, it is necessary to protect
the public interest by enacting measures designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide
health-related malpractice insurance while at the same time
establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from private
companies.
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to
provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced
against health care providers while limiting that time to a
specific period for which professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to
provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation
and settlement of claims.
1976
78-14-3. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to practice
audiology under Title 58, Chapter 41, Speech-language
Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act.
(2) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to
practice as a certified social worker under Section 58-60305.
(3) "Chiropractic physician" means a person licensed to
practice chiropractic under Title 58, Chapter 73, Chiropractic Physician Practice Act.
(4) "Clinical social worker" means a person licensed to
practice as a clinical social worker under Section 58-60305.
(5) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insurance as provided in Section 31A-2-102.
(6) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed to practice dental hygiene as defined in Section 58-69-102.
(7) "Dentist" means a person licensed to practice dentistry as defined in Section 58-69-102.
(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing created in Section 58-1-103.
(9) "Future damages" includes damages for future
medical treatment, care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future pain and suffering of
the judgment creditor.
(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or
on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care,
treatment, or confinement.
(11) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, association, corporation, or other facility or institution who causes to be rendered or who renders health
care or professional services as a hospital, physician,
registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife,
dentist, dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical laboratory
technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, podiatric
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physician, psychologist, chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic physician, osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, speech-language pathologist, clinical social worker, certified social worker, social
service worker, marriage and family counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others rendering similar care and
services relating to or arising out of the health needs of
persons or groups of persons and officers, employees, or
agents of any of the above acting in the course and scope
of their employment.
(12) "Hospital" means a public or private institution
licensed under Title 26, Chapter 21, Health Care Facility
Licensing and Inspection Act.
(13) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person licensed
to practice as a licensed practical nurse as provided in
Section 58-31b-301.
(14) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any action against a health care provider,
whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful
death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries
relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which
should have been rendered by the health care provider.
(15) "Marriage ant! ':i:/«ily therapist" means a person
licensed to practice as a marriage therapist or family
therapist under Section 58-60-405.
(16) "Naturopathic physician" means a person licensed
to practice naturopathy as defined in Section 58-71-102.
(17) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed to engage in practice as a nurse midwife under Section 58-44a301.
(18) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to practice
optometry under Title 58, Chapter 16a, Utah Optometry
Practice Act.
(19) "Osteopathic physician" means a person licensed
to practice osteopathy under Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah
Osteopathic Medical Practice Act.
(20) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of.
a health care provider, under a contract, express or
implied.
(21) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practice
pharmacy as provided in Section 58-17a-301.
(22) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to
practice physical therapy under Title 58, Chapter 24a,
Physical Therapist Practice Act.
(23) "Physician" means a person licensed to practice
medicine and surgery under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah
Medical Practice Act.
(24) "Podiatric physician" means a person licensed to
practice podiatry under Title 58, Chapter 5a, Podiatric
Physician Licensing Act.
(25) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice as a physician in this state under Title
58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act, or under Title
58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act.
(26) "Psychologist" means a person licensed under Title
58, Chapter 61, Psychologist Licensing Act, to practice
psychology as defined in Section 58-61-102.
(27) "Registered nurse" means a person licensed to
practice professional nursing as provided in Section 5831b-301.
(28) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other legal agent of the
patient.
(29) "Social service worker" means a person licensed to
practice as a social service worker under Section 58-60305.
(30) "Speech-language pathologist" means a person licensed to practice speech-language pathology under Title
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58, Chapter 41, Speech-language Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act.
(31) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or
negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately causing
injury or damage to another.
1998
78-14-4.

S t a t u t e of limitations — E x c e p t i o n s — Application.
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years after
the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of
t h e alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that:
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health
care provider is that a foreign object has been wrongfully
left within a patient's body, the claim shall be barred
unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence of the foreign
object wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first
occurs; and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient h a s
been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part
of a health care provider because that health care provider h a s affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the
alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless
commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered the fraudulent concealment,
whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons,
regardless of minority or other legal disability under Section
78-12-36 or any other provision of the law, and shall apply
retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and
corporations and to all health care providers and to all
malpractice actions against health care providers based upon
alleged personal injuries which occurred prior to the effective
date of this act; provided, however, that any action which
under former law could have been commenced after the
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the
unelapsed portion of time allowed under former law; but any
action which under former law could have been commenced
more t h a n four years after the effective date of this act may be
commenced only within four years after the effective date of
this act.
1979
78-14-4.5.

A m o u n t of a w a r d r e d u c e d by a m o u n t s of
collateral s o u r c e s available to plaintiff — N o
r e d u c t i o n w h e r e subrogation right e x i s t s —
Collateral s o u r c e s defined — P r o c e d u r e to
p r e s e r v e subrogation r i g h t s — E v i d e n c e admissible — E x c e p t i o n s .
(1) In all malpractice actions against health care providers
as defined in Section 78-14-3 in which damages are awarded to
compensate the plaintiff for losses sustained, the court shall
reduce the amount of such award by the total of all amounts
paid to the plaintiff from all collateral sources which are
available to him; however, there shall be no reduction for
collateral sources for which a subrogation right exists as
provided in this section nor shall there be a reduction for any
collateral payment not included in the award of damages.
Upon a finding of liability and an awarding of damages by the
trier of fact, the court shall receive evidence concerning the
total amounts of collateral sources which have been paid to or
for the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise available to
him. The court shall also take testimony of any amount which
has been paid, contributed, or forfeited by, or on behalf of the
plaintiff or members of his immediate family to secure his
right to any collateral source benefit which he is receiving as
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a result of his injury, and shall offset any reduction in the
award by such amounts. No evidence shall be received and no
reduction made with respect to future collateral source benefits except as specified in Subsection (4).
(2) For purposes of this section "collateral source" means
payments made to or for the benefit of the plaintiff for:
(a) medical expenses and disability payments payable
under the United States Social Security Act, any federal,
state, or local income disability act, or any other public
program, except the federal programs which are required
by law to seek subrogation;
(b) any health, sickness, or income disability insurance, automobile accident insurance that provides health
benefits or income disability coverage, and any other
similar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits
available to the plaintiff, whether purchased by the plaintiff or provided by others;
(c) any contract or agreement of any person, group,
organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay
for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or
other health care services, except benefits received as
gifts, contributions, or assistance made gratuitously; and
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation
plan provided by employers or any other system intended
to provide wages during a period of disability.
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts paid or
received prior to settlement or judgment, a provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30 days before settlement or
trial of the action a written notice upon each health care
provider against whom the malpractice action has been asserted. The written notice shall state the name and address of
the provider of collateral sources, the amount of collateral
sources paid, the names and addresses of all persons who
received payment, and the items and purposes for which
payment h a s been made.
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs that
provide payments or benefits available in the future to or for
the benefit of the plaintiff to the extent available irrespective
of the recipient's ability to pay. Evidence of the likelihood or
unlikelihood t h a t such programs, payments, or benefits will be
available in the future is also admissible. The trier of fact may
consider such evidence in determining the amount of damages
awarded to a plaintiff for future expenses.
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to recover
the amounts of such benefits from a health care provider, the
plaintiff, or any other person or entity as reimbursement for
collateral source payments made prior to settlement or judgment, including any payments made under Title 26, Chapter
19, except to the extent t h a t subrogation rights to amounts
paid prior to settlement or judgment are preserved as provided in this section. All policies of insurance providing
benefits affected by this section are construed in accordance
with this section.
• 1992

78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent — Proof
required of patient — Defenses — Consent to
health care.
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered by a
health care provider, it shall be presumed that what the
health care provider did was either expressly or impliedly
authorized to be done. For a patient to recover damages from
a health care provider in an action based upon the provider's
failure to obtain informed consent, the patient must prove the
following:
(a) t h a t a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient and health care provider;
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to the
patient;
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of
the health care rendered;
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(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and significant risk of causing the patient serious
harm;
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and
significant risk;
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not have consented to the health care rendered
after having been fully informed as to all facts relevant to
the decision to give consent. In determining what a
reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would
do under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall use the
viewpoint of the patient before health care was provided
and before the occurrence of any personal injuries alleged
to have arisen from said health care; and
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care rendered
was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by
the patient.
(2) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a
health care provider based upon alleged failure to obtain
informed consent if:
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the patient
actually suffered was relatively minor;
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from the
health care provider was commonly known to the public;
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the health care
complained of, that he would accept the health care
involved regardless of the risk; or that he did not want to
be informed of the matters to which he would be entitled
to be informed;
(d) the health care provider, after considering all of the
attendant facts and circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the manner and extent to which risks were
disclosed, if the health care provider reasonably believed
that additional disclosures could be expected to have a
substantial and adverse effect on the patient's condition;
or
(e) the patient or his representative executed a written
consent which sets forth the nature and purpose of the
intended health care and which contains a declaration
that the patient accepts the risk of substantial and
serious harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of health care and which acknowledges that
health care providers involved have explained his condition and the proposed health care in a satisfactory manner and that all questions asked about the health care and
its attendant risks have been answered in a manner
satisfactory to the patient or his representative; such
written consent shall be a defense to an action against a
health care provider based upon failure to obtain informed consent unless the patient proves that the person
giving the consent lacked capacity to consent or shows by
clear and convincing proof that the execution of the
written consent was induced by the defendant's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent
omission to state material facts.
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to
prevent any person 18 years of age or over from refusing to
consent to health care for his own person upon personal or
religious grounds.
(4) The following persons are authorized and empowered to
consent to any health care not prohibited by law:
(a) any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for his
minor child;
(b) any married person, for a spouse;
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco parentis,
whether formally serving or not, for the minor under his
care and any guardian for his ward;
(d) any person 18 years of age or over for his or her
parent who is unable by reason of age, physical or mental
condition, to provide such consent;
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(e) any patient 18 years of age or over;
(f) any female regardless of age or marital status,
when given in connection with her pregnancy or childbirth;
(g) in t h e absence of a parent, any adult for his minor
brother or sister; and
(h) in the absence of a parent, any grandparent for his
minor grandchild.
(5) No person who in good faith consents or authorizes
health care treatment or procedures for another as provided
by this act shall be subject to civil liability.
1976

78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability for
breach of guarantee, warranty, contract or
assurance of result.
No liability shall be imposed upon any health care provider
on the basis of an alleged breach of guarantee, warranty,
contract or assurance of result to be obtained from any health
care rendered unless t h e guarantee, warranty, contract or
assurance is set forth in writing and signed by t h e health care
provider or an authorized agent of the provider.
1976

78-14-7. Ad damnum clause prohibited in complaint.
No dollar amount shall be specified in the prayer of a
complaint filed in a malpractice action against a health care
provider. The complaint shall merely pray for such damages as
are reasonable in the premises.
1976

78-14-7.1. Limitation of award of noneconomic damages in malpractice actions.
In a malpractice action against a health care provider, an
injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience. In no case shall the
amount of damages awarded for such noneconomic loss exceed
$250,000. This limitation does not affect awards of punitive
damages.
1986

78-14-7.5. Limitation on attorney's contingency fee in
malpractice action.
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care provider
as defined in Section 78-14-3, an attorney shall not collect a
contingent fee for representing a client seeking damages in
connection with or arising out of personal injury or wrongful
death caused by the negligence of another which exceeds
33V&% of the amount recovered.
(2) This limitation applies regardless of whether the recovery is by settlement, arbitration, judgment, or whether appeal
is involved.
1985

78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action.
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be
initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective
defendant or his executor or successor, at least ninety days'
prior notice of intent to commence an action. Such notice shall
include a general statement of the nature of the claim, the
persons involved, the date, time and place of the occurrence,
the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct
on the part of the prospective defendant, the nature of the
alleged injuries and other damages sustained. Notice may be
in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his
attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized
and in the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure for the service of the summons and complaint in a
civil action or by certified mail, return receipt requested, in
which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the
date of mailing. Such notice shall be served within the time
allowed for commencing a malpractice action against a health
care provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days
prior to the expiration of the applicable time period, the time
for commencing the malpractice action against the health care
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provider shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service
of notice.
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed as relating to the limitation on the
time for commencing any action, and shall apply only to
causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This section
shall not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or
crossclaims against a health care provider.
1979

78-14-9. Professional liability insurance coverage for
providers — Insurance commissioner may require joint underwriting authority.
If the commissioner finds after a hearing t h a t in any part of
this state any professional liability insurance coverage for
health care providers is not readily available in the voluntary
market, and t h a t the public interest requires, he may by
regulation promulgate and implement plans to provide insurance coverage through all insurers issuing professional liability policies and individual and group accident and sickness
policies providing medical, surgical or hospital expense coverage on either a prepaid or an expense incurred basis, including
personal injury protection and medical expense coverage issued incidental to liability insurance policies.
1976

78-14-9.5. Periodic payment of future damages in malpractice actions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Future damages" means a judgment creditor's
damages for future medical treatment, care or custody,
loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future
pain and suffering.
(b) "Periodic payments" means the payment of money
or delivery of other property to the judgment creditor at
such intervals as ordered by the court.
(2) In any malpractice action against a health care provider,
as defined in Section 78-14-3, the court shall, at the request of
any party, order that future damages which equal or exceed
$100,000, less amounts payable for attorney's fees and other
costs which are due at the time of judgment, shall be paid by
periodic payments rather than by a lump sum payment.
(3) In rendering a judgment which orders the payment of
future damages by periodic payments, the court shall order
periodic payments to provide a fair correlation between the
sustaining of losses and the payment of damages. Lost future
earnings shall be paid over the judgment creditor's work life
expectancy. The court shall also order, when appropriate, that
periodic payments increase at a fixed rate, equal to the rate of
inflation which the finder of fact used to determine the amount
of future damages, or as measured by the most recent Consumer Price Index applicable to Utah for all goods and
services. The present cash value of all periodic payments shall
equal the fact finder's award of future damages, less any
amount paid for attorney's fees and costs. The present cash
value of periodic payments shall be determined by discounting
the total amount of periodic payments projected over the
judgment creditor's life expectancy, by the rate of interest
which the finder of fact used to reduce the amount of future
damages to present value, or the rate of interest available at
the time of trial on one year U.S. Government Treasury Bills.
Before periodic payments of future damages may be ordered,
the court shall require a judgment debtor to post security
which assures full payment of those damages. Security for
payment of a judgment of periodic payments may be in one or
more of the following forms:
(a) a bond executed by a qualified insurer;
(b) an annuity contract executed by a qualified insurer;
(c) evidence of applicable and collectable liability insurance with one or more qualified insurers;
(d) an agreement by one or more qualified insurers to
guarantee payment of the judgment; or
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(e) any other form of security approved by the court.
Security which complies with this section may also serve as
a supersedeas bond, where one is required.
(4) A judgment which orders payment of future damages by
periodic payments shall specify the recipient or recipients of
the payments, the dollar amount of the payments, the interval
between payments, and the number of payments or the period
of time over which payments shall be made. Those payments
may only be modified in the event of the death of the judgment
creditor.
(5) If the court finds that the judgment debtor, or the
assignee of his obligation to make periodic payments, has
failed to make periodic payments as ordered by the court, it
shall, in addition to the required periodic payments, order the
judgment debtor or his assignee to pay the judgment creditor
all damages caused by the failure to make payments, including court costs and attorney's fees.
(6) The obligation to make periodic payments for all future
damages, other than damages for loss of future earnings, shall
cease upon the death of the judgment creditor. Damages
awarded for loss of future earnings shall not be reduced or
payments terminated by reason of the death of the judgment
creditor, but shall be paid to persons to whom the judgment
creditor owed a duty of support, as provided by law, immediately prior to his death. In that case the court which rendered
the original judgment may, upon petition of any party in
interest, modify the judgment to award and apportion the
unpaid future damages in accordance with this section.
(7) If security is posted in accordance with Subsection (3),
and approved by a final judgment entered under this section,
the judgment is considered to be satisfied, and the judgment
debtor on whose behalf the security is posted shall be discharged.
1992

78-14-10. Actions under Utah Governmental Immunity
Act.
The provisions of this act shall apply to malpractice actions
against health care providers which are brought under the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act insofar as they are applicable; provided, however, t h a t this act shall in no way affect
the requirements for filing notices of claims, times for commencing actions and limitations on amounts recoverable under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
1976

78-14-11. Act not retroactive — Exception.
The provisions of this act, with the exception of the provisions relating to the limitation on the time for commencing an
action, shall not apply to injuries, death or services rendered
which occurred prior to the effective date of this act.
1976

78-14-12. Division to provide panel — Exemption —
Procedures — Statute of limitations tolled —
Composition of panel — Expenses — Division
authorized to set license fees.
(1) (a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in alleged
medical liability cases against health care providers as
defined in Section 78-14-3, except dentists.
(b) (i) The division shall establish procedures for
prelitigation consideration of medical liability claims
for damages arising out of the provision of or alleged
failure to provide health care.
(ii) The division may establish rules necessary to
administer the process and procedures related to
prelitigation hearings and the conduct of
prelitigation hearings in accordance with Sections
78-14-12 through 78-14-16.
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and are
not subject to Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative
Procedures Act, but are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation.
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(d) Proceedings conducted under authority of this section are confidential, privileged, and immune from civil
process.
(2) (a) The party initiating a medical liability action shall
file a request for prelitigation panel review with the
division within 60 days after the service of a statutory
notice of intent to commence action under Section 78-14-8.
(b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of
intent to commence action. The request shall be mailed to
all health care providers named in the notice and request.
(3) (a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review
under this section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of 60 days following the division's
issuance of an opinion by the prelitigation panel, or 60
days following the termination of jurisdiction by the
division as provided in this subsection. The division shall
send any opinion issued by the panel to all parties by
regular mail.
(b) (i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under this section within 180 days after the filing
of the request for prelitigation panel review, or within
any longer period as agreed upon in writing by all
parties to the review.
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within the time limits established in Subsection (3)(b)(i), the division has no further jurisdiction
over the matter subject to review and the claimant is
considered to have complied with all conditions precedent required under this section prior to the commencement of litigation.
(c) (i) The claimant and any respondent may agree by
written stipulation that no useful purpose would be
served by convening a prelitigation panel under this
section.
(ii) When the stipulation is filed with the division,
the division shall within ten days after receipt enter
an order divesting itself ofjurisdiction over the claim,
as it concerns the stipulating respondent, and stating
that the claimant has complied with all conditions
precedent to the commencement of litigation regarding the claim.
(4) The division shall provide for and appoint an appropriate panel or panels to hear complaints of medical liability and
damages, made by or on behalf of any patient who is an
alleged victim of medical liability. The panels are composed of:
(a) one member who is a resident lawyer currently
licensed and in good standing to practice law in this state
and who shall serve as chairman of the panel, who is
appointed by the division from among qualified individuals who have registered with the division indicating a
willingness to serve as panel members, and a willingness
to comply with the rules of professional conduct governing
lawyers in the state of Utah, and who has completed
division training regarding conduct of panel hearings;
(b) (i) one member who is a licensed health care provider listed under Section 78-14-3, who is practicing
and knowledgeable in the same specialty as the
proposed defendant, and who is appointed by the
division in accordance with Subsection (5); or
(ii) in claims against only hospitals or their employees, one member who is an individual currently
serving in a hospital administration position directly
related to hospital operations or conduct that includes responsibility for the area of practice that is
the subject of the liability claim, and who is appointed
by the division; and
(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital
employee, or other health care provider, and who is a
responsible citizen of the state, selected and appointed by
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the division from among individuals who have completed
division training with respect to panel hearings.
(5) (a) Each person listed as a health care provider in
Section 78-14-3 and practicing under a license issued by
the state, is obligated as a condition of holding that
license to participate as a member of a medical liability
prelitigation panel at reasonable times, places, and intervals, upon issuance, with advance notice given in a
reasonable time frame, by the division of an Order to
Participate as a Medical Liability Prelitigation Panel
Member.
(b) A licensee may be excused from appearance and
participation as a panel member upon the division finding
participation by the licensee will create an unreasonable
burden or hardship upon the licensee. ..-..•
(c) A licensee whom the division finds failed to appear
and participate as a panel member when so ordered,
without adequate explanation or justification and without
being excused for cause by the division, may be assessed
an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000.
(d) A licensee whom the division finds intentionally or
repeatedly failed to appear and participate as a panel
member when so ordered, without adequate explanation
or justification and without being excused for cause by the
division, may be assessed an administrative fine not to
exceed $5,000, and is guilty of unprofessional conduct.
(e) All fines collected under Subsections (5)(c) and (d)
shall be deposited in the Physicians Education Account
created in Section 58-67a-l.
(6) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify,
under oath, that he has no bias or conflict of interest with
respect to any matter under consideration.
(7) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per diem compensation and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established by rules of the division.
(8) (a) In addition to the actual cost of administering the
licensure of health care providers, the division may set
license fees of health care providers within the limits
established by law equal to their proportionate costs of
administering prelitigation panels.
(b) The claimant bears none of the costs of administering the prelitigation panel except under Section 78-14-16.
1997

78-14-13. Proceedings — Authority of panel — Rights
of parties to proceedings.
(1) No record of the proceedings is required and all evidence, documents, and exhibits are returned to the parties or
witnesses who provided the evidence, documents, and exhibits
at the end of the proceedings upon the request of the parties or
witnesses who provided the evidence.
(2) The division may issue subpoenas for medical records
directly related to the claim of medical liability in accordance
with division rule and in compliance with the following:
(a) the subpoena shall be prepared by the requesting
party in proper form for issuance by the division; and
(b) the subpoena shall be accompanied by:
(i) an affidavit prepared by the person requesting
the subpoena attesting to the fact the medical record
subject to subpoena is believed to be directly related
to the medical liability claim to which the subpoena is
related; or
(ii) by a written release for the medical records to
be provided to the person requesting the subpoena,
signed by the individual who is the subject of the
medical record or by that individual's guardian or
conservator.
(3) Per diem reimbursement to panel members and expenses incurred by the panel in the conduct of prelitigation
panel hearings shall be paid by the division. Expenses related
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to subpoenas are paid by the requesting party, including
witness fees and mileage.
(4) The proceedings are informal and formal rules of evidence are not applicable. There is no discovery or perpetuation
of testimony in the proceedings, except upon special order of
the panel, and for good cause shown demonstrating extraordinary circumstances.
(5) (a) A party is entitled to attend, personally or with
counsel, and participate in the proceedings, except upon
special order of the panel and unanimous agreement of
the parties. The proceedings are confidential and closed to
the public.
(b) No party h a s the right to cross-examine, rebut, or
demand that customary formalities of civil trials and
court proceedings be followed. The panel may, however,
request special or supplemental participation of some or
all parties in particular respects. (c) Communications between the panel and the parties,
except the testimony of the parties on the merits of the
dispute, are disclosed to all other parties.
(6) The division shall appoint a panel to consider the claim
and set the matter for panel review as soon as practicable after
receipt of a request.
(7) Parties may be represented by counsel in proceedings
before a panel.
1994

78-14-14. Decision and recommendations of panel —
No judicial or other review.
The panel shall render its opinion in writing not later than
30 days after the end of the proceedings. The panel shall
determine on the basis of the evidence whether each claim
against each health care provider has merit or has no merit
and, if meritorious, whether the conduct complained of resulted in harm to the claimant.
There is no judicial or other review or appeal of the panel's
decision or recommendations.
1985

78-14-15. Evidence of proceedings not admissible in
subsequent action — Panelist may not be
compelled to testify — Immunity of panelist
from civil liability — Information regarding
professional conduct.
(1) Evidence of the proceedings conducted by the medical
review panel and its results, opinions, findings, and determinations are not admissible as evidence in an action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of competent
jurisdiction.
(2) No panelist may be compelled to testify in a civil action
subsequently filed with regard to the subject matter of the
panel's review. A panelist has immunity from civil liability
arising from participation as a panelist and for all communications, findings, opinions, and conclusions made in the course
and scope of duties prescribed by this section.
(3) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to prohibit
t h e division from considering any information contained in a
statutory notice of intent to commence action, request for
prelitigation panel review, or written findings of a panel with
respect to the division's determining whether a licensee engaged in unprofessional or unlawful conduct.
1994
78-14-16.

P r o c e e d i n g s c o n s i d e r e d a b i n d i n g arbitrat i o n h e a r i n g u p o n w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t of part i e s — C o m p e n s a t i o n t o m e m b e r s of panel.
Upon written agreement by all parties, the proceeding may
be considered a binding arbitration hearing and proceed under
Title 78, Chapter 31a, except for the selection of the panel,
which is done as set forth in Subsection 78-14-12(4). If the
proceeding is considered an arbitration proceeding, the parties
are equally responsible for compensation to the members of
the panel for services rendered.
1985
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78-14-17. Arbitration a g r e e m e n t s .
(1) After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement
between a patient and a health care provider to be validly
executed or, if the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not
been previously met on at least one occasion, renewed:
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing and by verbal
explanation, the following information on:
(i) the requirement t h a t the patient must arbitrate
a claim instead of having the claim heard by a judge
or jury;
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in
which arbitrators are selected under the agreement;
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitration-related costs under the agreement;
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into
the agreement and still receive health care;
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each
year unless the agreement is canceled in writing
before the renewal date; and
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about
the arbitration agreement answered; and
(b) the agreement shall require that:
(i) one arbitrator be collectively selected by all
persons claiming damages;
(ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care
provider;
(iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all
persons claiming damages and the health care provider from a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the state or federal courts of Utah;
(iv) all parties waive the requirement of Section
78-14-12 to appear before a hearing panel in a malpractice action against a health care provider;
(v) the patient be given the right to rescind the
agreement within 30 days of signing the agreement;
and
(vi) the term of the agreement be for one year and
that the agreement be automatically renewed each
year unless the agreement is canceled in writing by
the patient or health care provider before the renewal
date.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be
denied health care of any kind on the sole basis that the
patient or a person described in Subsection (5) refused to enter
into a binding arbitration agreement with a health care
provider.
(3) A written acknowledgment of having received a written
and verbal explanation of a binding arbitration agreement
signed by or on behalf of the patient shall be a defense to a
claim that the patient did not receive a written and verbal
explanation of the agreement as required by Subsection (1)
unless the patient:
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement
lacked the capacity to do so; or
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the
execution of the agreement was induced by the health
care provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts.
(4) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a
claim governed by a binding arbitration agreement that was
executed or renewed before May 3, 1999.
(5) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection
78-14-5(4), except a person temporarily standing in loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitration agreement on behalf of a patient.
(6) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement
that is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1
et seq.
1999
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B. The transfer agreement shall include provisions
L The client record department shall be under the
ection of a registered record administrator, RRA, for:
1. criteria for transfer;
an accredited record technician, ART.
2. appropriate methods of transfer;
1. If a RRA or an ART is not employed at least part
3. transfer of information needed for proper care
le, the facility shall consult at least semi-annually
:h a RRA or ART according to the needs of the and treatment of the individual transferred;
4. security and accountability of personal property
ility.
of the individual transferred;
L203 Retention and Storage
\. Provision shall be made for the filing, safe stor5. proper notification of hospital and responsible
B, and easy accessibility of client records.
person before transfer;
L. The record and its contents shall be safeguarded
6. the facility responsible for client care in the prom loss, defacement, tampering, fires, and floods.
cess
of transfer;
2. Records shall be protected against access by un7. client confidentiality.
thorized individuals.
4.400 Administrator
B. Client records shall be retained for at least seven
4.401 Qualifications
ars after the last date of client care. Records of
A. Each facility shall appoint, in writing, an adnors shall be retained as follows:
1. at least two years after the minor reaches age 18 ministrator professionally licensed by the Utah Department of Commerce as a nursing home administhe age of majority;
trator.
2. a minimum of seven years.
B. The administrator shall supervise no more than
C. All client records shall be retained within the
one licensed health care facility.
cility upon change of ownership.
C. The administrator shall have sufficient freedom
D. When a facility ceases operation, provision shall
! made for appropriate safe storage and prompt re- from other responsibilities and shall be on the premieval of all client records, client indices, and dis- ises of the facility a sufficient number of hours in the
targes for the period specified in 4.203B. The facility business day, and at other times as necessary, to peray arrange storage of client records with another mit attention to the management and administration
cility or may return client records to the attending of the facility.
lysician who is still in the community. The facility
D. The administrator shall designate, in writing,
tall:
the name and title of the person who shall act as
1. within three business days of closure, notify the administrator in any temporary absence of the adepartment in writing of the provisions for the safe ministrator. This person shall have sufficient power,
•eservation of records and their location;
authority, and freedom to act in the best interests of
2. publish in a local newspaper the location of all client safety and well-being. It is not the intent of this
Lcility client records.
paragraph to permit an unlicensed de facto adminisE. The facility shall notify the Department in writ- trator to supplant or replace the designated, licensed
ig within 10 business days whenever client records administrator.
re inadvertently defaced or destroyed.
4.402 Administrator responsibilities
4.204 Signature Authorization
A. The administrator's responsibilities shall be inComputer signatures and rubber stamp signatures cluded in a written job description on file in the facillay be used in lieu of the written signature of the ity and available for Department review.
hysician/licensed practitioner if the facility retains
B. The job description shall include responsibility
tie signator's signed statement acknowledging ulti- to insure the following duties are fulfilled:
late responsibility for the use of the computer or
1. complete, submit, and file all records and reports
tamp signature and specifying the conditions for its required by the Department;
ise.
2. act as a liaison with the licensee, qualified men4.300 Services Provided Under Agreements with tal retardation professional, QMRP, and other super)utside Sources
visory staff of the facility;
4.301 Contracts
3. respond appropriately to recommendations made
A. If a service required under this subpart is not by the facility committees;
•rovided directly, the facility shall have a written
4. assure that employees are oriented to their job
Lgreement with an outside program, resource, or ser- functions and receive appropriate and regularly
vice to furnish the necessary service, including emer- scheduled in-service training;
gency and other health care.
5. implement policies and procedures for the operaB. The agreement shall:
tion of the facility;
1. contain the responsibilities, functions, objectives,
6. hire and maintain the required number of limd other terms agreed to by both parties;
censed and nonlicensed staff, as specified in these
2. provide that the facility is responsible for assur- rules, to meet the needs of clients;
ng that the outside services meet the standards for
7. maintain facility staffing records for at least the
juality of services contained in this subpart.
preceding 12 months;
C. The facility shall assure that outside services
8. secure and update contracts for required profesmeet the needs of each client.
sional and other services not provided directly by the
D. If living quarters are not provided in a facility facility;
owned by the ICF/MR, the ICF/MR remains directly
9. verify all required licenses and permits of staff
responsible for the standards relating to physical environment that are specified in R432-150-3 and and consultants at the time of hire and/or effective
date of contract;
R432-152-6.
10. review all incident/accident reports and take
4.302 Transfer Agreements
A. The licensee shall maintain, where appropriate, appropriate action.
a. Incident/accident reports shall be numbered and
a written transfer agreement with one or more hospitals, or nearby health facilities, to facilitate the logged in a manner to account for all reports.
Digitized
by the Howard W.
Law Library, J.reports
Reuben shall
Clark Law
b. Hunter
Incident/accident
haveSchool,
spaceBYU.
for
transfer of clients and essential client
information.
Machine-generated
OCR, by
maythe
contain
errors.
written comments
administrator
and, as ap-
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propriate, the attending phys
committee.
c. Original incident/accident
on file in the facility and shall 1
by the Department.
4.500 Staff and Personnel
4.501 Staff Qualifications a
A. The administrator, QMR]
pervisors shall develop job des<
tion including job title, job sum
qualifications, required skills a
cal requirements.
B. Periodic employee per
shall be documented.
C. All personnel shall have (
and procedure manuals and ot
sary to effectively perform du
sponsibilities.
4.502 Health Surveillance
A. The facility shall establi
dures for the health screening <
to identify communicable dise
sions, or any other situation wl
employee from performing assi
factory manner. This screenii
within the first two weeks of ei
essary thereafter.
B. Tuberculin testing of all n
nel shall be conducted within t
of employment unless the emp]
had a previous significant tul
defined in R386-702-5, Utah
1. If the tuberculin test is n
ployee shall be released from fi
lin testing unless there is free
exposure to persons with com
tuberculosis.
2. If the tuberculin test is si
ployee has had a significant
and has not had adequate chei
amination and evaluation sha
dance with R386-702-5, Utah
C. All dietary and other stafl
obtain a Food Handler's Permi
department.
4.600 Client Protections
4.601 Protection of Clients'
A. The facility shall ensure t
B. The facility shall:
1. inform each client, pare
minor, or legal guardian, of the
rules of the facility;
2. inform each client, pare
minor, or legal guardian, of th
dition, developmental and be!
dant risks of treatment, and
treatment;
3. allow and encourage indi
cise their rights as clients of tl
zens of the United States, incl
complaints, and the right to (
client shall be afforded the opp<
ances and recommend changes
dures to facility staff and outs
personal choice, free from rest]
ercion, discrimination, or repi
4. allow individual clients t<
cial affairs and teach them to
their capabilities;
5. ensure that clients are not
verbal, sexual or psychological
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shall be given by the facility to the State Medical
Examiner and the registrar of the local probate court
and a copy of said notice shall be filed with the Department.
G. Upon sale of the facility or other transfer of ownership, the facility shall provide the new owner with
a written accounting, prepared by an independent
Certified Public Accountant, of all client funds being
transferred, and obtain a written receipt for those
funds from the new owner.
4.603 Communication with Clients, Parents, and
Guardians
The facility shall:
A. promote participation of parents (if the client is
a minor) and legal guardians in the process of providing active treatment to a client unless their participation is unobtainable or inappropriate;
B. answer communications from clients' families
and friends promptly and appropriately;
C. promote visits by individuals with a relationship
to the client, such as family, close friends, legal
guardians and advocates, at any reasonable hour,
without prior notice, consistent with the right of the
client's and other clients' privacy, unless the interdisciplinary team determines that the visit would not be
appropriate for that client;
D. promote visits by parents or guardians to any
area of the facility that provides direct client care
services to the client, consistent with right of that
client's and other clients' privacy;
E. promote frequent and informal leaves from the
facility for visits, trips, or vacations;
F. notify promptly the client's parents or guardian
of any significant incidents, or changes in the client's
condition including, but not limited to, serious illness, accident, death, abuse, or unauthorized absence.
4.604 Staff Treatment of Clients
A. The facility shall develop and implement written policies and procedures that prohibit mistreatment, neglect or abuse of the client.
1. Staff of the facility shall not use physical, verbal,
sexual or psychological abuse or punishment.
2. Staff shall not punish a client by withholding
food or hydration that contributes to a nutritionally
adequate diet.
3. The facility shall prohibit the employment of individuals with a conviction or prior employment history of child, client abuse, spouse abuse, neglect or
mistreatment.
B. The facility shall ensure that all allegations of
mistreatment, neglect or abuse, as well as injuries of
unknown source, are reported immediately to the administrator and to other officials in accordance with
Title 62A, Chapter 3, Part 3, and Chapter 4, Part 5,
Utah Code, through established procedures.
C. The facility shall have evidence that all alleged
violations are thoroughly investigated and shall prevent further potential abuse while the investigation
is in progress.
D. The results of all investigations shall be reported to the administrator or designated representative and to other officials in accordance with Title
62A, Chapter 3, Part 3, and Chapter 4, Part 5, Utah
Code, within five working days of the incident and, if
the alleged violation is verified, appropriate corrective action shall be taken.
4.700 Facility Staffing
4.701 Qualified Mental Retardation Professional
A. Each client's active treatment program shall be
integrated, coordinated and monitored by a qualified
mental retardation professional.

920

B. The qualified mental retardation professional
shall:
1. have at least one year of experience working directly with persons with mental retardation or other
developmental disabilities; and
2. be one of the following:
a. a doctor of medicine and/or osteopathy;
b. a registered nurse;
c. an individual who holds at least a bachelor's degree in a professional category specified in 4.702 below.
4.702 Professional Program Services
A. Each client shall receive the professional program services needed to implement the active treatment program defined by each client's individual program plan. Professional program staff shall work directly with clients and with paraprofessional, nonprofessional and other professional program staff who
work with clients.
B. The facility shall have available enough qualified professional staff to carry out and monitor the
various professional interventions in accordance with
the stated goals and objectives of every individual
program plan.
C. Professional program staff shall participate as
members of the interdisciplinary team in relevant aspects of the active treatment process.
D. Professional program staff shall participate in
on-going staff development and training in both formal and informal settings with other professional,
paraprofessional and nonprofessional staff members.
E. Professional program staff shall be licensed, certified, or registered, as applicable, to provide professional services in the state of Utah.
1. To be designated as an occupational therapist, an
individual shall be licensed in accordance with Title
58, Chapter 42, Utah Code.
2. To be designated as an occupational therapy assistant, an individual shall be licensed in accordance
with Title 58, Chapter 42, Utah Code.
3. To be designated as a physical therapist, an individual shall be licensed in accordance with Title 58,
Chapter 24, Utah Code.
4. To be designated as a physical therapy assistant,
an individual shall be licensed in accordance with
Title 58, Chapter 24, Utah Code.
5. To be designated as a psychologist, an individual
shall be licensed in accordance with Title 58, Chapter
25, Utah Code.
6. To be designated as a social worker, an individual shall be licensed in accordance with Title 58,
Chapter 35, Utah Code.
7. To be designated as a speech-language pathologist or audiologist, an individual shall be licensed in
accordance with Title 58, Chapter 41, Utah Code.
8. To be designated as a professional recreation
staff member, an individual shall be licensed in accordance with Title 58, Chapter 40, Utah Code.
F. Those professional program staff who do not fall
under the jurisdiction of state licensure, certification,
or registration requirements, specified in Title 58,
Utah Code, shall meet the following qualifications:
1. to be designated as a professional dietitian, an
individual shall be eligible for registration by the
American Dietetics Association;
2. to be designated as a human services professional, an individual shall have at least a bachelor's
degree in a human services field, including, but not
limited to: sociology, special education, rehabilitation
counseling, and psychology.
G. If the client's individual program plan is being
successfully implemented by facility staff, profes-
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sional program staff meeting the qualifications of
4.702 are not required:
1. except for qualified mental retardation professionals;
2. except for the requirements of 4.702B of this section concerning the facility's provision of enough*
qualified professional program staff;
3. unless otherwise specified by State licensure and
certification requirements.
4.703 Direct Care Staffing
A. The facility shall not depend upon clients or volunteers to perform direct care services for the facility.
B. There shall be responsible direct care staff on
duty and awake on a 24-hour basis, when clients are
present, to take prompt, appropriate action in case of
injury, illness, fire or other emergency, in each defined residential living unit housing:
1. clients for whom a physician has ordered a medical care plan;
2. clients who are aggressive, assaultive or security
risks;
3. more than 16 clients;
4. Sixteen or fewer clients within a multi-unit
building.
C. There shall be a responsible direct care staff person on duty on a 24-hour basis, when clients are
present, to respond to injuries and symptoms of illness, and to handle emergencies, in each defined residential living unit housing:
1. clients for whom a physician has not ordered a
medical care plan;
2. clients who are not aggressive, assaultive or security risks;
3. sixteen or fewer clients.
D. The facility shall provide sufficient support staff
so that direct care staff are not required to perform
support services to the extent that these duties interfere with the exercise of their primary direct client
care duties.
4.704 Residential Living Unit Staff
A. The facility shall provide sufficient direct care
staff to manage and supervise clients in accordance
with their individual program plans.
B. Direct care staff are defined as the present onduty staff calculated over all shifts in a 24-hour period for each defined residential living unit.
C. Direct care staff shall be provided by the facility
in the following minimum ratios of direct care staff to
clients:
1. for each defined residential living unit serving
children under the age of 12, severely and profoundly
retarded clients, clients with severe physical disabilities, or clients who are aggressive, assaultive, or security risks, or who manifest severely hyperactive or
psychotic-like behavior, the staff to client ratio is 1 to
3.2 (2.5 hours per client per 24 hour period);
2. for each defined residential living unit serving
moderately retarded clients, the staff to client ratio is
1 to 4 (2.0 hours per client per 24 hour period);
3. for each defined residential living unit serving
clients who function within the range of mild retardation, the staff to client ratio is 1 to 6.4 (1.25 hours per
client per 24 hour period).
D. When there are no clients present in the living
unit, a responsible staff member shall be available by
telephone.
4.705 Staff Training Program
A. The facility shall provide each employee with
initial and continuing training that enables the employee to perform his or her duties effectively, efficiently, and competently.
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B. For employees who work with clients, training
shall focus on skills and competencies directed toward
clients' developmental, behavioral, and health needs.
C. Staff shall be able to demonstrate the skills and
techniques necessary to administer interventions to
manage the inappropriate behavior of clients.
D. Staff shall be able to demonstrate the skills and
techniques necessary to implement the individual
program plans for each client for whom they are responsible.
4.706 Volunteers
A. Volunteers may be utilized in the daily activities of the facility but may not be included in the
facility's staffing plan in lieu of facility employees.
B. Volunteers shall be supervised and familiar with
a client's rights and the facility's policies and procedures.
C. Volunteers who provide personal care to clients
shall be adequately screened, at least 18 years of age,
or at least 16 years of age and under the direct supervision of a qualified employee.
R432-152-5. Client Treatment Services.
5.100 Active Treatment Services
5.101 Active Treatment
A. Each client shall receive a continuous active
treatment program, which includes aggressive, consistent implementation of a program of specialized
and generic training, treatment, health services and
related services described in this subpart that is directed toward:
1. the acquisition of the behaviors necessary for the
client to function with as much self determination
and independence as possible;
2. the prevention or deceleration of regression or
loss of current optimal function status.
B. Active treatment does not include services to
maintain generally independent clients who are able
to function with little supervision or in the absence of
an aggressive, consistent, continuously implemented
program.
5.102 Admissions, Transfers, and Discharge
A. Clients who are admitted by the facility shall be
in need of and receiving active treatment services.
B. Admission decisions shall be based on a preliminary evaluation of the client that is conducted or
updated by the facility or by outside sources.
C. A preliminary evaluation shall contain background information as well as currently valid assessments of functional developmental, behavioral, social, health and nutritional status to determine if the
facility can provide for the client's needs and if the
client is likely to benefit from placement in the facility.
D. If a client is to be either transferred or discharged, the facility shall:
1. have documentation in the client's record that
the client was transferred or discharged for good
cause;
2. provide a reasonable time, except in emergencies, to prepare the client and his or her parents or
guardian for the transfer or discharge.
E. At the time of discharge, the facility shall:
1. develop a final summary of the client's developmental, behavioral, social, health and nutritional status and, with the consent of the client, parents, if the
client is a minor, or legal guardian, provide a copy to
authorized persons and agencies;
2. provide a post-discharge plan of care that will
assist the client to adjust to the new living environment.
5.103 Individual Program Plan
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2. identify the location where program strategy inA. Each client shall have an individual program
an developed by an interdisciplinary team that rep- formation, which shall be accessible to any person
sents the professions, disciplines or service areas responsible for implementation, can be found;
3. include, for those clients who lack them, training
at are relevant to:
1. identifying the client's needs, as described by the in personal skills essential for privacy and indepenmprehensive functional assessments required in dence, including, but not limited to, toilet training,
personal hygiene, dental hygiene, self-feeding, bathL03C;
2. designing programs that meet the client's needs. ing, dressing, grooming, and communication of basic
B. Appropriate facility staff shall participate in in- needs, until it has been demonstrated that the client
rdisciplinary team meetings. Participation by other is developmentally incapable of acquiring them;
4. identify mechanical supports, if needed, to
encies serving the client is encouraged. Participa>n by the client, client's parent, if the client is a achieve proper body position, balance, or alignment.
inor, or the client's legal guardian is required un- The plan shall specify the reason for each support, the
3S that participation is unobtainable or inappropri- situations in which each is to be applied, and a schedule for the use of each support;
e.
5. provide that clients who have multiple disabling
C. Within 30 days after admission, the interdisciinary team shall perform accurate assessments or conditions spend a major portion of each waking day
assessments as needed to supplement the prelimi- out of bed and outside the bedroom area, moving
iry evaluation conducted prior to admission. The about by various methods and devices whenever posmprehensive functional assessment shall take into sible;
6. include opportunities for client choice and selfnsideration the client's age, for example, child,
ung adult, or elderly person, and the implications management.
G. A copy of each client's individual program plan
r active treatment at each stage, as applicable, and
shall be made available to all relevant staff, includall:
1. identify the presenting problems and disabilities ing staff of other agencies who work with the client,
and to the client, parents, if the client is a minor, or
Ld where possible, their causes;
2. identify a client's specific developmental legal guardian.
5.104 Program Implementation
rengths;
A. As soon as the interdisciplinary team has formu3. identify a client's specific developmental and belated a client's individual program plan, each client
ivioral management needs;
4. identify a client's need for services without re- shall receive a continuous active treatment program
rd to the actual availability of the services needed; consisting of needed interventions and services in suf5. include physical development and health, nutri- ficient number and frequency to support the achievement of the objectives identified in the individual pro>nal status, sensorimotor development, affective degram plan.
lopment, speech and language development, audiB. The facility shall develop an active treatment
ry functioning, cognitive development, social devel- schedule that outlines the current active treatment
ment, adaptive behaviors and independent living program and that is readily available for review by
ills necessary for a client to be able to function in relevant staff.
e community, and as applicable, vocational skills.
C. Except for those facets of the individual program
D. Within 30 days after admission, the interdisci- plan that shall be implemented only by licensed perinary team shall prepare for each client an individ- sonnel, each client's individual program plan shall be
il program plan that states the specific objectives implemented by all staff who work with the client,
scessary to meet the client's needs, as identified by including professional, paraprofessional, and nonproe comprehensive assessment required by 5.103C, fessional staff.
id the planned sequence for dealing with those
5.105 Program Documentation
jectives. These objectives shall:
A. Data relative to accomplishment of the criteria
1. be stated separately, in terms of a single behav- specified in client individual program plan objectives
ral outcome;
shall be documented in measurable terms.
2. be assigned projected completion dates;
B. The facility shall document significant events
3. be expressed in behavioral terms that provide that are related to the client's individual program
easurable indices of performance;
plan and assessments and that contribute to an over4. be organized to reflect a developmental progres- all understanding of the client's ongoing level and
3n appropriate to the individual;
quality of functioning.
5. be assigned priorities.
5.106 Program Monitoring and Change
E. Each written training program designed to imA. The individual program plan shall be reviewed
ement the objectives in the individual program plan at least by the qualified mental retardation profestall specify:
sional and revised as necessary, including, but not
1. the methods to be used;
limited to, situations in which the client:
1. has successfully completed an objective or objec2. the schedule for use of the method;
tives identified in the individual program plan;
3. the person responsible for the program;
2. is regressing or losing skills already gained;
4. the type of data and frequency of data collection
3. is failing to progress toward identified objectives
jcessary to be able to assess progress toward the
after reasonable efforts have been made;
jsired objectives;
4. is being considered for training towards new
5. the inappropriate client behavior, if applicable;
6. provision for the appropriate expression of be- objectives.
B. At least annually, the comprehensive functional
ivior and the replacement of inappropriate behavr, if applicable, with behavior that is adaptive or assessment of each client shall be reviewed by the
interdisciplinary team for relevancy and updated as
>propriate.
needed, and the individual program plan shall be reF. The individual program plan shall also:
1. describe relevant interventions to support the vised, as appropriate, repeating the process set forth
in 5.103.
dividual toward independence;
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f. a mechanism for monitoring and controlling the
C. The facility shall designate and use a specially
constituted committee or committees consisting of use of such interventions.
members of the facility staff, parents, legal guardB. Interventions to manage inappropriate client beians, clients as appropriate, qualified persons who havior shall be employed with sufficient safeguards
have experience or training in contemporary prac- and supervision to ensure that the safety, welfare and
tices to change inappropriate client behavior, and civil and human rights of clients are adequately propersons with no ownership or controlling interest in tected.
the facility to:
C. Techniques to manage inappropriate client be1. review, approve, and monitor individual pro- havior shall never be used for disciplinary purposes,
grams designed to manage inappropriate behavior for the convenience of staff or as a substitute for an
and other programs that, in the opinion of the com- active treatment program.
mittee, involve risks to client protection and rights;
D. The use of systematic interventions to manage
2. insure that these programs are conducted only inappropriate client behavior shall be incorporated
with the written informed consent of the client, par- into the client's individual program plan, in accordance with 5.103D and E.
ent, if the client is a minor, or legal guardian;
E. Standing or as needed programs to control inap3. review, monitor and make suggestions to the facility about its practices and programs as they relate propriate behavior are not permitted.
to drug usage, physical restraints, time-out rooms,
5.203 Time-Out Rooms
application of painful or noxious stimuli, control of
A. A client may be placed in a room from which
inappropriate behavior, protection of client rights egress is prevented only if the following conditions
and funds, and any other area that the committee are met:
believes need to be addressed.
1. The placement is part of an approved systematic
D. The provisions of paragraph 5.106C may be time-out program as required by 5.202. Thus, emermodified only if in the judgment of the state survey gency placement of a client into a time-out room is
agency, court decrees, state law or regulations pro- not allowed.
vide for equivalent client protection and consultation.
2. The client is under the direct constant visual
supervision of designated staff.
5.200 Client Behavior and Facility Practices
3. The door to the room is held shut by staff or by a
5.201 Conduct Toward Clients
A. The facility shall develop and implement writ- mechanism requiring constant physical pressure
ten policies and procedures for the management of from a staff member to keep the mechanism engaged.
B. Placement of a client in a time-out room shall
conduct between staff and clients. These policies and
not exceed one hour.
procedures shall:
C. Clients placed in time-out rooms shall be pro1. promote the growth, development and indepentected from hazardous conditions including, but not
dence of the client;
2. address the extent to which client choice will be limited to, presence of sharp corners and objects, unaccommodated in daily decision-making, emphasiz- covered light fixtures, unprotected electrical outlets.
D. A log of the use of each time-out room shall be
ing self-determination and self-management, to the
kept.
extent possible;
3. specify client conduct to be allowed or not al5.204 Physical Restraints
lowed;
A. The facility may employ physical restraint only:
4. be available to all staff, clients, parents of minor
1. as an integral part of an individual program plan
children, and legal guardians.
that is intended to lead to less restrictive means of
B. To the extent possible, clients shall participate managing and eliminating the behavior for which the
in the formulation of these policies and procedures. restraint is applied;
C. Clients shall not discipline other clients, except
2. as an emergency measure, but only if absolutely
as part of an organized system of self-government, as necessary to protect the client or others from injury;
set forth in facility policy.
3. as a health-related protection prescribed by a
5.202 Management of Inappropriate Client Behav- physician, but only if absolutely necessary during the
ior
conduct of a specific medical or surgical procedure, or
A. The facility shall develop and implement writ- only if absolutely necessary for client protection durten policies and procedures that govern the manage- ing the time that a medical condition exists.
ment of inappropriate client behavior. These policies
B. Authorizations to use or extend restraints as an
and procedures shall be consistent with the provi- emergency shall be:
sions of 5.201. These procedures shall:
1. in effect no longer than 12 consecutive hours;
1. specify all facility approved interventions to
2. obtained as soon as the client is restrained or
manage inappropriate client behavior;
stable.
2. designate these interventions on a hierarchy to
C. The facility shall not issue orders for restraint
be implemented, ranging from most positive or least on a standing or as needed basis.
intrusive, to least positive or most intrusive;
D. A client placed in restraint shall be checked at
3. ensure, prior to the use of more restrictive tech- least every 30 minutes by staff trained in the use of
niques, that the client's record documents that pro- restraints, released from the restraint as quickly as
grams that incorporate the use of less intrusive or possible, and a record of these checks and usage shall
more positive techniques have been tried systemati- be kept.
cally and demonstrated to be ineffective;
E. Restraints shall be designed and used so as not
4. address the following:
to cause physical injury to the client and so as to
cause the least possible discomfort.
a. the use of time-out rooms;
F. Opportunity for motion and exercise shall be
b. the use of physical restraints;
c. the use of drugs to manage inappropriate behav- provided for a period of not less than 10 minutes during each two hour period in which restraint is emior;
ployed, and a record of such activity shall be kept.
d. the application of painful or noxious stimuli;
G. Barred enclosures shall not be more than three
e. the staff members who may authorize the use of
feet in height and shall not have tops.
specified
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Not Reported in S.W.2d
(Cite as: 1987 WL 16560 (Tenn.App.))
SEE COURT OF APPEALS RULES 11 AND 12
Thomas Derek REASONS, by Jean Reasons
HALL, Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
STATE of Tennessee, Defendant/Appellee.
Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Western Section, at
Jackson.
September 8, 1987.
TN Claims Commission No. 2, Claim No. T4-182,
Tom Anderson, Commissioner.
Donna R. Davis of Gilreath & Associates,
Knoxville, for petitioner/appellant.
Michael L. Parsons, Office of Attorney General,
Nashville, and William A. Smith, Jr., Arlington, for
defendant/appellee.
TOMLIN, Presiding Judge, Western Section.
*1 Petitioner, a mentally retarded male, brought
this action by his mother, as natural guardian,
against the state of Tennessee, seeking damages. It
was filed originally with the Board of Claims and
was later transferred to the Tennessee Claims
Commission. The petitioner alleged that certain
employees of the Arlington Developmental Center
(hereafter 'Center'), an intermediate care facility for
the mentally retarded, were negligent in the care
rendered petitioner.
Specifically, the petition
alleged that while eating food prepared at the Center
petitioner swallowed a bone that lodged in his
esophagus, resulting in an esophageal perforation
and infection.
Following a hearing, the
Commissioner found in favor of the State and
dismissed the petition. Petitioner's appeal presents
the following issues: (1) whether the Center was
negligent in allowing bones to be included in the
meals of a thirty-four-year old person who is
profoundly retarded; (2) whether the Center was
negligent in the manner in which its staff cared for
and observed petitioner following a choking incident
so as to determine properly whether an obstruction
was lodged in his throat; and (3) whether negligence
contributing to a delay in treatment was the
proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries and damages.
We resolve each of these issues in favor of the
defendant.

Virtually all, if not all, of the material facts in this
case are not in dispute. Petitioner is a thirty-fouryear old 'profoundly retarded' male. He developed
mental retardation at the age of seven months when
he contracted cerebral meningitis.
The term
'profoundly retarded' refers to one who is severely
retarded. Petitioner has the mental capacity of a
one-year-old child. He communicates principally
through hand and body gestures. He can speak only
two or three words. His usual behavior consists of
such things as bumping his head against the wall and
floor, repeatedly biting his hands, removing his
clothes, incontinence, seizures for which he is given
medication, and with regularity grabbing food from
the meal trays of other residents of the Center,
stuffing it into his mouth.
The Arlington Developmental Center is located in
Shelby County. It is operated by the State of
Tennessee for its citizens who are mentally retarded.
It is classified by the federal government as an
'Intermediate Care Facility' for the mentally
retarded. Part of its funding comes from the federal
government.
Petitioner was cared for by his mother at home until
he was approximately sixteen years of age. He
became a resident of Arlington Development Center
in 1971, remaining there until after the incident in
question.
While at the Center, petitioner resided in a unit
named 'Daniel Boone III.' This unit normally
housed eighteen residents and was staffed twentyfour hours a day by trained personnel called
'Developmental Technicians' (DT's). A group of
eighteen residents would have as few as two DT's
and as many as four DT's present during any one
eight-hour shift. Petitioner and other residents of
Daniel Boone III were served their meals in a small
dining area in the unit. Specific patients were
designated as charges for a particular DT who had
the responsibility of supervising his or her patients
during their meal time.
*2 In addition to the above-mentioned staff, there
were developmental technician supervisors (DTS's),
nurses and a medical staff along with an infirmary
provided at the Center. Nurses and at least one staff
physician were on the premises at all times.
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On July 10, 1983, petitioner was seen to grab a
handful of sliced roast beef from the plate of another
resident and proceed to stuff it in his mouth, as a
result of which he choked. Reginald Williams, a
DTS, was working in petitioner's unit at that time
and observed the incident.
He immediately
performed a procedure similar to the Heimlich
Maneuver, which caused petitioner to regurgitate the
roast beef. Williams then proceeded to remove the
balance of the meat in petitioner's mouth by hand.
Petitioner was observed both by Williams and the
nurse on duty to be breathing and functioning
normally following the incident.
Body checks of the residents at the Center are made
at every shift change, which is every eight hours. A
body check consists of a close personal inspection by
the DT assigned to that patient. It includes having
the patient remove the clothes first from the upper
portion and then from the lower portion of his body.
The DT then checks the patient for any cuts,
bruises, abrasions or anything of a physical nature
out of the ordinary. At a shift change on the
morning of July 19, 1983, the DTS observed that
petitioner had substantial swelling in his neck and
that he refused to swallow. In addition, petitioner
refused to eat his breakfast and was running a
temperature of 103 degrees. This information was
relayed to the nurses on duty who in turn called Dr.
Armona, one of the staff physicians, to examine
plaintiff.
At the time Dr. Armona examined petitioner he
was not informed of the choking incident of July
10th, nor was he advised that on the previous day,
July 18th, it was recorded in the progress notes that
petitioner had been 'acting very slow as if he was
very sleepy, vomited a small amount of liquid. No
foods. Refused to eat his lunch.'
Following his examination, Dr. Armona turned
petitioner over to Dr. Carruthers, the staff physician
who normally attended to petitioner, and he was
transferred to the infirmary at the Center.
Following several tests, Dr. Carruthers diagnosed
petitioner's condition to be a paratonsillar abscess.
The following morning, July 20th, x-rays of
petitioner's throat revealed a foreign body lodged
therein. He was transferred immediately to the City
of Memphis Hospital, where surgery was performed
by a Dr. Kavanaugh.
During surgery Dr.
Kavanaugh removed a bone which he and another
Copr. © West 1998 No C
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doctor concluded to be a chicken bone measuring
one inch by three-quarters of an inch by threequarters of an inch. It had lodged in petitioner's
esophagus and perforated it, causing a serious
infection. Petitioner was in intensive care for
approximately twelve weeks. He was discharged on
October 31, 1983 and thereafter made a complete
recovery.
I. PETITIONER'S DIET.
*3 This issue as presented by petitioner is
somewhat confusing to the Court.
Petitioner
complains of defendant's providing a diet for
petitioner that from time to time might contain
bones. Yet, it is contended on behalf of petitioner
that the bone on which petitioner choked was found
in the roast beef which petitioner grabbed from the
plate of another resident and shoved into his own
mouth. We are thus faced with the immediate
question of whether it was a bone in petitioner's
food or a bone in the food served to another patient.
There is absolutely no testimony in this record
reflecting that a bone of any sort was every found in
any of petitioner's food during the period in
question. By the same token, the proof in this
record identifies the bone as a chicken bone, more
specifically, the head of the femur.
The
uncontradicted proof is also to the effect that the
meat petitioner grabbed from his fellow patient's
plate was thinly sliced roast beef-not chicken-and
that it contained no bones of any sort.
Petitioner has failed to establish by competent
expert proof the standard of care in this situation.
Furthermore, petitioner has failed to establish by
any proof that defendant breached a standard of care
On the other hand, Dr. Wellington Mock,
Assistant Superintendent for Community Services at
the Center, testified that it was a basic underlying
policy at the Center, mandated by applicable federal
guidelines, that to the greatest extent possible,
residents at the Center were to be 'normalized.' He
defined normalization as the process of not allowing,
but encouraging, the patients to develop the best
rhythm of life possible, and to do so to allow them
to carry out the customs and routines that are
normal. As he stated, they were entitled to the
'dignity of risk,' that in order to allow mentally
retarded patients to develop to their fullest capacity,
they should be permitted to run the risks of danger
or harm in progressing up the ladder o'
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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that he showed no discoloration, no loss of breathing
and demonstrated a normal pulse.

development.
It was required that the staff at the Center develop
an individual habitation plan for each resident. This
included the ascertainment and establishment of the
dietary needs of each resident, following the
individualized observations by the staff, which
included a physical therapist, occupational therapist,
dietician, doctor, nurse, teacher, vocational person,
social worker, psychologist, aide and team leader.
Clearly, a resident's dietary needs under these
circumstances are something outside the scope of
common knowledge of a layman and require a
professional determination.
As developed, the
petitioner's diet plan called for a regular diet with
triple portions. A regular diet did not include in its
process an active overt screening of each and every
meal served to petitioner or any other resident
receiving a regular diet to eliminate absolutely the
presence of any bones from it.
It is our
responsibility to review the findings of the
Commissioner de novo upon the record with a
presumption of correctness. Rule 13(d) T.R.A.P.
From our review of the record, we hold that the
evidence does not preponderate against the findings
of the Commissioner that petitioner failed to
establish that defendant needed to remove all bones
from all food served to every profoundly retarded
patient or resident.
II. THE CHOKING INCIDENT.
*4 The thrust of petitioner's second issue is to the
effect that defendant and its servants and employees
were negligent in their treatment of petitioner
following the choking incident of July 10, 1983.
We find this issue to be completely without merit.
While petitioner contends that defendant should have
taken further precautions to assure that petitioner
had suffered no harm or injury from the choking, a
reading of the record reveals that petitioner failed to
present proof to establish just what precautions
defendant should have taken and what applicable
standard of care the defendant allegedly violated.
As noted earlier, a DTS executed the Heimlich
Maneuver to dislodge the roast beef from
petitioner's mouth. He then removed the balance of
the meat from petitioner's mouth by hand.
Following this incident, the nurse on duty and other
DT's maintained an observation of petitioner, noting

We have heretofore described the body searches
that are conducted on the residents three times a
day. One of the compelling reasons for such a
procedure, as dehumanizing and degrading as it
might seem to the uneducated layman, lies in the
fact that people like petitioner, who are profoundly
retarded, find it virtually impossible to communicate
pain or other discomfort to others. As presented by
the proof of the defendant, body searches were
conducted on the petitioner three times a day from
July 10 to July 19, with no distress of any type on
the part of the petitioner being noted until the
afternoon or evening of July 18th. The evidence
does not preponderate against the Commissioner's
findings as to this issue.

III.
THE
TREATMENT.'

ALLEGED

'DELAY

IN

Petitioner has contended that defendant's employees
were negligent in that they failed to notify a
physician of the July 10 choking incident, and that
more specifically on the morning of July 19th when
a physician was summoned, he was not informed at
that time of the July 10th incident or of the events
occurring on July 18. The Commissioner below
found that members of the staff of the Center were
negligent in failing to inform the Center's medical
doctors on July 19th of the choking incident but
found that this alleged act of negligence was not the
proximate cause of petitioner's injuries and
damages.
A review of the chronology of events is important
to the consideration of this issue. Petitioner choked
on thin sliced roast beef on July 10th. The meat was
removed, his mouth cleared, and he was thereafter
observed by staff members, including the nurse,
who found no problems with breathing, swallowing,
etc. Four DT's testified without contradiction that
they were with the plaintiff during at least five of
the nine days between the 10th and the 19th, that
they observed and assisted him with his meals, and
that he ate solid foods regularly during this period of
time without any difficulty.
In addition, they
performed daily body checks three shifts per day,
noting nothing unusual about petitioner until the
morning of the 19th.
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*5 Furthermore, the bone removed from
petitioner's throat was identified by the doctor who
removed it as a chicken bone. There was medical
testimony based upon the nature and size of the bone
removed that plaintiff could not have ingested solid
food after the swallowing of the bone. In light of
the uncontradicted testimony about petitioner's
eating solid food during this period, in our opinion,
this evidence rules out the ingestion of the chicken
bone with the thin sliced roast beef on July 10th.
Under the circumstances, we see nothing to relate
the choking incident of the 10th to the findings of
the 20th so as to justify a finding of negligence on
the part of the staff in failing to so advise the staff
physician on the 19th. Furthermore, failure of the
DT's or the nurse to report to the doctor on the
morning of the 19th that on the previous afternoon
petitioner was observed to be lethargic, he vomited a
small amount of liquid and refused to eat lunch
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would not rise to the dignity of negligence. It also
should be noted that there was medical testimony to
the effect that without more information this would
not cause the doctor to believe that an esophageal
perforation was the problem.
Reviewing the
evidence on a whole, we are of the opinion that the
evidence preponderates against the finding of the
Commissioner that the staff members were negligent
in failing to inform the doctors on July 19, 1983. In
addition, if it were considered to be negligence, we
are also of the opinion that the evidence failed to
establish a causal relationship between the alleged
negligence and any of the petitioner's injuries.
The judgment of the Commissioner is affirmed.
Costs in this cause are taxed to the petitioner, for
which execution may issue if necessary.
HIGHERS AND FARMER, JJ., concur.
END OF DOCUMENT
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